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Without addressing the measurement problem (i.e.what causes the wave function to “collapse”, or
to “branch”, or a history to become realized, or a property to actualize), I discuss the problem of
the timing of the quantum measurement: assuming that in an appropriate sense a measurement
happens, when precisely does it happen? This question can be posed within most interpretations of
quantum mechanics. By introducing the operator M , which measures whether or not the quantum
measurement has happened, I suggest that, contrary to what is often claimed, quantum mechanics
does provide a precise answer to this question, although a somewhat surprising one.
Quantum mechanics was not originally formulated as a
general dynamical theory of the world, but as the the-
ory of quantum microsystems interacting with classical
macrosystems. In the original formulation of the theory,
the interaction of a quantum microsystem S with a clas-
sical macrosystem O is described in terms of “quantum
measurements”. If the macrosystem O interacts with
the variable q of the microsystem S, and S is in a su-
perposition of states with different values of q, then the
macrosystem O “sees” only one of the values of q, and
the interaction modifies the state of S by projecting it
into a state with that value.
It was noticed early that this formulation raises certain
difficulties, particularly if we want to view the theory
as the general dynamical theory of anything, and not
just microsystems in the laboratory. These difficulties
are usually referred to as the “measurement problem”
and they have motivated ingenious attempts to modify
either quantum mechanics or its interpretation.
In this letter, I do not discuss the measurement prob-
lem. Rather, I discuss a secondary problem, which as
far as I understand, appears in most (but not all) for-
mulations of quantum mechanics. The problem I dis-
cuss is the determination of the precise time at which
the quantum measurement happens. Let me illustrate,
without any ambition of precision or completeness, how
this problem manifests itself in some popular interpre-
tations of the theory. In one interpretation, a system S
has a wave function, which collapses during a measure-
ment. Is the collapse of the wave function instantaneous?
If so, when precisely does it happen? In another inter-
pretation, the system is described in terms of its prop-
erties, or values of its dynamical variables. These be-
come manifest, and take definite values when observed,
in a measurement. Do properties become manifest sud-
denly? When precisely do they become manifest, in a
realistic laboratory experiment? In another interpreta-
tion, the wave function never collapses but it branches.
When precisely does the branching happens? In another
interpretation, the wave function never branches, but we,
observers, navigate through it and sit in one or the other
of its components. When is it, precisely, that the se-
lection of this or that component happens? In another
interpretation, there is no wave function, but only proba-
bilities assigned to sequences of (quantum) events. When
is it precisely that a quantum event “happens”? Namely,
when precisely can we replace the statement “this may
happen with probability p” with the statement “this has
happened”?
The most common answer to these questions is that
quantum mechanics does not determine the time at which
the measurement happens. As is well known, for in-
stance, von Neumann, pointed out that we can freely
move the boundary between the quantum system and
the observer, and therefore also shift the measurement’s
presumed time, without affecting physical predictions [1];
and Heisenberg insisted that we can compute probability
transitions between initial and final states, but we must
abstain from asking “in between” questions [2]. Accord-
ing to this view, the question “when does the measure-
ment happen” does not seem to be a well posed question.
In this letter, I claim that, contrary to that view, quan-
tum mechanics does give a precise answer to this ques-
tion, although a peculiar answer. More precisely, I claim
that: (i) a precise (operational) sense can be given to
the question of the timing of the measurement; (ii) we
can then compute the time at which the measurement
happens (in the sense specified) using standard quantum
techniques; (iii) the (more or less realistic) interpretation
of the physical meaning of this time is no more prob-
lematic than the interpretation of any other quantum
result. I will also venture in suggesting that this ob-
servation might partially illuminate some aspects of the
major problem – the measurement problem itself.
The answer I present here is based on two main ideas.
First, that the question “When does the measurement
happen?” is quantum mechanical in nature, and not clas-
sical. Therefore its answer must be probabilistic. In gen-
eral, in quantum mechanics the answer to a question such
as “Is the spin up?” is not “Yes” or “No”, but rather:
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“Yes with probability, say, 1/2”, which implies that the
spin will come out “up” in half the repetitions of the ex-
periment. Similarly, I am roughly going to argue that
“half way through a measurement” the measurement is
not “partially happened”, but just “happened with prob-
ability 1/2”, or “already realized in half of the repetitions
of the experiment”. The second idea is that the question
“When does the measurement happen?” does not regard
the measured quantum system S alone, but rather the
coupled system formed by the observed system S and
the observer system O. Therefore the appropriate theo-
retical setting for answering this question is the quantum
theory of the two coupled systems. In particular, I will
submit that there is no contradiction in using the quan-
tum theory of S for describing the observed behavior of
S and the quantum theory of the coupled S −O system
for answering the question of the precise timing of the
measurement.
More in detail, this paper is based on a technical obser-
vation: there is an operator that has a natural interpre-
tation as measuring whether or not the measurement has
happened. I will denote this operator asM (for Measure-
ment). The operatorM is a projection operator, with the
eigenvalue 1 meaning “the measurement has happened”,
and the eigenvalue 0 meaning “the measurement has not
happened”. By applying standard quantum mechanical
rules to this operator, at every time t we can compute
a precise (although probabilistic) answer to the question
whether or not the measurement has happened.
The description of the quantum measurement that I
employ here is based on the Peres-Wootters analysis of
the quantum measurements of finite duration [3]. Sev-
eral of the ideas on which this paper is based were first
introduced therein. In particular, the key idea that mea-
surement can be defined operationally, in terms of the
correlation that could be detected by a second external
apparatus, is in [3]. Peres and Wootters do not intro-
duce the operator M considered here, but discuss the
related idea of computing the probability distribution of
the measured variable, conditionalized by the observed
position of the apparatus’ pointer. The aim of Peres and
Wootters was to provide a physical analysis of realistic
measurements and their intrinsic limitations. Here, on
the other hand, I am interested in the general notion of
measurement and on what we can say on when we re-
place the statement “this may happens with probability
p” with the statement “this has happened”.
The result described here has emerged within the rela-
tional interpretation of quantum mechanics [4]. See also
the strictly related Kochen’s interpretation [5], and refer-
ence [6], where these two interpretations are compared.
This result, however, does not require such interpreta-
tions, and I present it here in a form which is indepen-
dent from the interpretation of quantum mechanics one
holds.
Just to fix a language, I will refer here to a traditional
(and a bit out of fashion) “wave function collapse” ter-
minology, leaving to the reader the burden of translating
what I say in his or her preferred language. Consider a
physical system S (an electron). Assume that S interacts
with another physical system O (an apparatus measur-
ing the spin of the electron), and that the interaction
between S and O qualifies as a quantum measurement
of the variable q of the system S. Choosing the simplest
setting, and following a terminology which is now stan-
dard, I assume that q has only two discrete eigenvalues,
a and b, and denote by |a〉 and |b〉 the two corresponding
eigenstates. The interaction between S and O is gov-
erned by an interaction hamiltonian HI . A necessary
condition for the interaction to be a measurement is that
we can prepare O in an initial state, which we denote
|init〉, such that in a finite time T the interaction will
evolve (perhaps up to some approximation) |a〉 ⊗ |init〉
into |a〉⊗ |Oa〉 and |b〉⊗ |init〉 into |b〉⊗ |Ob〉, where |Oa〉
and |Ob〉 are states of O that we can identify as “the
pointer of the apparatus indicates that q has value a”, or
b, respectively. Up to now, I have only given definitions.
As it is well known, the linearity of quantum mechanics
implies that if S is initially in a quantum superposition
ca|a〉+ cb|b〉, the combined system will evolve from
Ψ(0) =
(
ca|a〉+ cb|b〉
)
⊗ |init〉 (1)
into
Ψ(T ) = ca|a〉 ⊗ |Oa〉 + cb|b〉 ⊗ |Ob〉. (2)
Examples of models of interactions of the kind described
are well known (see for instance [7]), and are easy to
construct in the case of simple experiments such as a
Stern-Gerlach measurement.∗
For some reason, at some point we have to (or we can)
replace the pure state Ψ(T ) with a mixed state. Equiva-
lently, we replace Ψ(T ) with either
Ψa = |a〉 ⊗ |Oa〉, (3)
or
Ψb = |b〉 ⊗ |Ob〉, (4)
where, of course, the probability of having one or the
other is |ca|
2 and |cb|
2 respectively. Since here I am not
discussing the measurement problem, I will not address
the problem of the meaning of this step (whether it is
∗The difficulty of describing the dynamics of quantum mea-
surement in terms of Schro¨dinger evolution is not in showing
how the system may evolve into a correlated state. It is in
understanding how it may go from the correlated state to a
mixture, or to an eigenstate of the measured quantity.
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a physical event, a change in our knowledge, a mental
event, a perspectival event, or other). Nor I will discuss
whether, or how, or why, or under which circumstances,
this wave function collapse happens.
Rather, I simply assume that in some appropriate sense
the wave function changes from (2) to either (3) or (4)
and the quantity q acquires a definite value; and I focus
on the question of what we can say about the precise
time t at which this happens.
At the time T , the system has reached the state (2),
and a definite correlation between the pointer variable,
with eigenstates |Oa〉 and |Ob〉, and the system variable,
with eigenstates |a〉 and |b〉, is established. Before that
time, in general, this correlation is absent, or incomplete.
If the wave function has collapsed, and the state is either
(3) or (4), the correlation is present as well. In other
words, the happening of the measurement is tied to the
fact that the complete correlation is established.
This well known observation has prompted many to
suggest that the measurement (of the quantity q, by the
pointer variable) happens in the moment in which the
complete correlation is established. In modal interpreta-
tions, for instance, the quantity q “has value” only if the
state is in the (Schmidt, or biorthogonal) form (2). This
would lead us to say that the measurement of q happens
instantaneously in the moment the complete correlation
is established.† I consider here a different approach to
the problem.
Notice that there is a precise sense in which we can
measure whether, at some time t intermediate between
t = 0 and t = T , the measurement has happened or not.
In fact, let us suppose that at t we bring a further external
apparatus O′ in and we measure the value of q as well as
the position of the pointer (the two commute, of course).
Then, either (Case 1 ) we find the pointer in the correct
position corresponding to the value of q that we have
found - namely we obtain {a and Qa}, or {b and Qb}; or
(Case 2 ) the pointer is not on the correct position.‡ The
question “Has the pointer already measured q at time t?”
†This solution does not convince me for various reasons.
First, nature is never clean, and in a realistic case the exact
form (2) is never attained. One might reply that if the state
is “close” to the form (2), then it will still have a Schmidt
decomposition into a basis “close” to the eigenbasis of q; but
unfortunately this is not true: Schmidt bases jump badly any-
time the state passes close to a degenerate state, and a state
“very close to (2)” may defines a Schmidt basis in which a
quantity completely unrelated to q is diagonal. Second, quan-
tummechanics gives us probabilistic statements about nature.
Why should it give us a sharp answer for the measurement
time?
‡Typically, the pointer will fail to be in the correct position
not because it is in the wrong position, but because it is still
in |init〉.
has therefore a natural interpretation: if we find Case 1,
we can say that the pointer has already measured q; if we
find Case 2, it hasn’t. Thus, the question of the timing
at which a measurement happens can be given a simple
operational interpretation, independent from any meta-
physics, or any interpretation of quantum mechanics, one
might hold. The operational procedure described assigns
a precise meaning to the question. Can we then answer
the question? Certainly yes, because quantum mechan-
ics provides us the tool for predicting the outcome of the
measurement described. More precisely, it provides us
the tool for computing the probabilities of finding Case
1 or Case 2, for any given state Ψ(t) of the combined
S − O system. These probabilities are obtained as fol-
lows.
Define the operator M on the state space of the S −
O system, as the projection operator on the subspace
spanned by the two states Ψa and Ψb:
M ≡ |Ψa〉〈Ψa|+ |Ψb〉〈Ψb|. (5)
Namely
M
(
|a〉 ⊗ |Oa〉
)
= |a〉 ⊗ |Oa〉 (6)
M
(
|b〉 ⊗ |Ob〉
)
= |b〉 ⊗ |Ob〉 (7)
M
(
|a〉 ⊗ |Ob〉
)
= 0 (8)
M
(
|b〉 ⊗ |Oa〉
)
= 0 (9)
and
M
(
|ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉
)
= 0 (10)
if 〈φ|Oa〉 = 0 and 〈φ|Ob〉 = 0.
M is a self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert space of
the coupled system. Therefore it may admit an interpre-
tation as an observable property of the coupled system.
In all the eigenstates of M with eigenvalue 1 the pointer
variable correctly indicates the value of q. In all the eigen-
states of M with eigenvalue 0, it does not. Therefore, M
has the following interpretation: M = 1 means that the
pointer (correctly) measures q. M = 0 means that it does
not. Now, when the pointer of the apparatus correctly
measures the value of the observed quantity, we say that
the measurement has happened. Therefore we can say
that M = 1 has the physical interpretation “The mea-
surement has happened”, and M = 0 has the physical
interpretation “the measurement has not happened”.
Since M is a genuine self-adjoint operator on the
Hilbert space of the coupled system, and since it has an
unambiguous physical interpretation, we can apply the
standard interpretation rules of quantum mechanics to
it. In particular, for all states that are not eigenstates of
M , quantum mechanics tells us that we must not inter-
pret these states as having “intermediate” values; but,
rather, they have one or the other values with a certain
probability. That is, if a state Ψ of the coupled system is
3
not a perfectly correlated state of the form (2), (3), or (4),
then in general we must conclude that Ψ is a superposi-
tion of a state in which the measurement has happened
and a state in which the measurement has not happened.
In particular, if we follow the Schro¨dinger evolution
Ψ(t) of the state of the coupled system from t = 0 to
t = T , then at every intermediate t we can compute the
probability P (t) that the measurement has happened
P (t) = 〈Ψ(t)|M |Ψ(t)〉 (11)
For a good measurement, P (t) will be a smooth function
that goes monotonically from 0 to 1 in the time interval 0
to T . Therefore, half way through the measurement, we
cannot say that the measurement has “half happened”:
we must say that the measurement “has happened with
probability P (t)”.
The last statement has a precise operational meaning:
we may repeat the physical process in which O measures
the quantity q of S a large number of trials. In each
trial, at a time t < T after the beginning of the pro-
cess, we can check whether or not the measurement has
already happened by having the second “external” appa-
ratus O′ measuring q and the position of the pointer. If
the two match, then O has detected the “correct” value
of q: “a measurement has happened”. Standard quan-
tum mechanical arguments show that P (T ), defined in
(11), gives precisely the fraction of the trials in which we
will detect that the measurement has happened.
The correctness of this interpretation of M is particu-
larly evident in the following case. Imagine that the two
pointer states |Oa〉 and |Ob〉 represent two LED’s that
light up when the O apparatus has measured a, or, re-
spectively, b. Also, assume that in the measurement the
“wrong” states |a〉 ⊗ |Ob〉 and |b〉 ⊗ |Oa〉 happens with
null or negligible probability (a realistic assumption for a
good measurement). If we ask an experimentalist when
is the measurement completed, he will probably answer:
“when one of the LED’s lights up”. But the distribution
probability of the time at which the LED lights up can
be theoretically computed, and is given precisely by P (t),
becauseM is the projector on the subspace on which one
of the LED’s is on.
If P (t) is the probability that the measurement has
happened at time t, then the probability (density) p(t)
that the measurement happens between time t and time
t+ dt is
p(t) =
dP (t)
dt
=
d
dt
〈Ψ(t)|M |Ψ(t)〉
= 〈Ψ(t)|[M,H ]|Ψ(t)〉, (12)
where H is the total hamiltonian. I introduce the oper-
ator
m = [M,H ]. (13)
Its expectation value at time t gives the probability den-
sity for the measurement to happen at time t
p(t) = 〈Ψ(t)|m|Ψ(t)〉. (14)
For a good measurement in which P (t) grows smoothly
and monotonically from zero to one, p(t) will a “bell
shaped” curve, defining the time at which the measure-
ment happens, and its quantum dispersion.
The operators M and m can be generalized to an ar-
bitrary number of eigenvalues of the quantity measured.
If the apparatus is able to distinguish the (eigen)values
a1 . . . an of the variable q, by means of the pointer posi-
tions Oa1 . . .Oan, then M is given by
M =
∑
i=1,n
(
|ai〉 ⊗ |Oai〉
)(
〈ai| ⊗ 〈Oai|
)
, (15)
and this definition can easily be generalized to continuous
spectra.
Thus, we can conclude that quantum mechanics pro-
vides a precise meaning and a precise answer to the ques-
tion of when a measurement happens. The answer is, like
any other answer to physical questions in quantum the-
ory, a probabilistic one.§ Using the operatorm defined in
(13,15), the probability p(t) that the measurement hap-
pens at time t can be computed at every intermediate
time from (14). This quantity can be explicitly computed
from the standard quantum physics of the system.
I close with some observations and general comments.
The first observation refers to the relation between the is-
sue discussed here and the general measurement problem.
The interpretation of the operator M and of the predic-
tions it yields are infested by the same subtle problems
that infest any other quantum operator. For instance,
one may ask whether M measures “if the measurement
has indeed really happened”, or whether “we shall find
that the measurement has happened if we check”. The
distinction refers to the very possibility of assigning val-
ues to quantities irrespectively from observations, and
thus touches the core of the measurement problem. As I
said, I do not discuss this major conundrum here. The in-
terpretation of the time at which a measurement happens
has no less and no more difficulties than the interpreta-
tion any other quantity of a quantum system. In particu-
lar, I warn the reader of not charging my claim with more
§Quantum events, the individual events at the basis of
modern physics, happen randomly – precisely as the Dem-
ocritean κλινα`µǫν, the individual events at the basis of an-
cient physics, which, in Lucretius marvelous verses, happen
“incerto tempore . . . incertisque loco”: at a random time and
in a random place. [8]
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meaning than what it deserves. I am not claiming that
there is an “element of reality” in the fact that a mea-
surement has happened, or that, in general “measure-
ment having happened or not” is an objective property of
the coupled system. I am only claiming: i) that the the
time t at which a measurement happens is a well defined
concept in the theory (so precise that it can be defined
operationally); and ii) that this time, or, more precisely
its probability distribution, can be explicitly computed if
the unitary dynamics of the system-apparatus dynamics
is known. Thus, this time is as well defined a quantity
as, say, the position of a particle: if we know the dy-
namics, we can, at any moment, compute its probability
distribution.
The notion of measurement that I have referred to in
this paper does not require that phase coherence is def-
initely lost. Also, I have made no reference to physical
decoherence. If quantum mechanics is exactly correct
in nature (as I assume here), then phase coherence is
never definitely lost. (In principle one can always make
an interference experiment between the spin up and the
spin down components of the state, even after a macro-
scopic Stern Gerlach apparatus has registered the out-
come on printed paper.) In practice, phase coherence is
lost via physical decoherence, say into the environment,
as beautifully realized by Zurek [9], making the pure and
the mixed states effectively indistinguishable. Thus, the
question of when a quantum correlation (the pure state)
can be effectively described as a mixed state is already
solved. This, however, is not the question I have ad-
dressed here. The question I have addressed refers to the
fact that one or the other of the physical values of q be-
come, at some point, part of our reality: a mystery that,
as Zurek emphasizes in the conclusion of [9], remains also
after understanding physical decoherence. Without ad-
dressing the issue of how this actualization of the values
of q may come about, I have discussed here “when” we
may say it happens.
An issue often discussed in the context of the mea-
surement problem is the one of imperfect measurements.
Imagine that an interaction between a system S and an
“apparatus” O is such that after the interaction the cou-
pled system ends up in a state which is close, but not
exactly equal, to the state (2). Has the measurement
happened, even if perfect correlation has not been estab-
lished? The approach presented here offers a solution to
the conundrum. The solution is that the measurement
has happened with high probability. In practical terms,
this means that it has happened in almost all, but not
all, the trials.
A related observation is that the existence of the M
operator might perhaps cause an embarrassment for the
modal interpretation. In fact, quantum mechanics con-
tains an operator corresponding to the question “When
does q take a definite value?”, a question addressed in de-
tail within modal views. But the answer that quantum
mechanics provides seems inconsistent with the modal
view that q has a definite value only when the requisite
biorthogonal correlation is established.∗∗
A possible objection to the present work is that it is
relevant within certain interpretations of quantum me-
chanics, but it is irrelevant within the interpretations in
which no mention of quantum measurement is made, such
as the histories interpretations [10]. This is a delicate is-
sue, which requires a case by case discussion that would
not fit into this brief note. I only sketch here some general
considerations on this regard. Following [3], I have given
an operational definition of the measurement’s timing.
Under such a definition, measurement’s timing makes
sense within any interpretation. But why would we want
to discuss measurement within a measurement-free inter-
pretation? As suggested in the beginning of the paper, I
think that within most, if not all, interpretations, there
is always a point in which we have to jump from the
statement that something may happen with probability
p, to the statement that something, in some appropri-
ate sense, has happened. Otherwise, what is it that dis-
tinguishes the (probabilistic) predictions we make from
the (non-probabilistic) data we have about the world,
on which those predictions are based? As cleanly made
clear in particular by the histories interpretation, quan-
tum mechanical predictions do not depend just on the
data: they also depend on the question asked. One can
refuse to discuss the step in which predictions become
data, as prescribed in the histories interpretation, and
reset the theoretical machinery at every newly acquired
data. This is fine. But nothing then prevents somebody
else to ask the further question of whether one can pre-
dict if and when the theoretical machinery can be reset.
The histories-interpretation view, I think, is that this
question has no answer within quantum mechanics. This
is precisely Heisenberg’s claim, mentioned above. Here,
contrary to that claim, I have suggested that one can
still keep the interpretation as it is, but add to it, coher-
ently, a meaningful prediction on when the resetting of
the theoretical machinery can be made.††
∗∗I thank John Earman for this observation.
†† I add a more speculative remark. I suspect that in spite of
brilliant attempts to purge quantum mechanics of any “spe-
cial moment” in time in which measurements happen, such
“special moments” remain in most, if not all, interpretations
of quantum mechanics, sometimes in a hidden fashion. A
coherent way of avoiding this problem is to relegate it to a
still to be discovered theory of consciousness, as David Mer-
min has recently, coherently, suggested in [11] (on a related
vein, see [12]). Short of this noble and courageous declara-
tion of failure, we may purge quantum mechanics from the
expression “measurement”, pleasing Bell [13], but the mys-
tery posed by these “special moments”, whether we call them
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The answer to the timing problem I have discussed is
peculiar in one respect: it involves the simultaneous use
of the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics at two
levels. I have combined the use of the quantum theory
of the S − O system, in which the operator M is de-
fined, with the quantum theory of the system S alone, in
which we may talk of the collapse of the wave function
due to the interaction of S with O. There is something
slightly conceptually anomalous in doing that. I think
that this anomaly is not a defect of the idea proposed
here. Rather, it represents its essential aspect. This pro-
cedure might shed some light on the relational aspects
of quantum theory. There is a subtle point here: the
fact that a “time of measurement” can be computed does
not imply that the wave function collapse is an objective
observer-independent event. On the contrary, to my un-
derstanding, the core of the measurement problem is the
fact that if we take quantum mechanics as a general the-
ory of mechanics, we must combine two apparently badly
contradictory facts. On the one hand, the value of the
variable q is definitely directly observed by O (by us). On
the other hand, phase coherence is never really lost, and
thus the “other branch” is still somehow there, even if not
for O (for us). The precise time at which the measure-
ment happens can be observed, and can be operationally
defined in the manner described above, but not by O.
Rather, by the third system (O′) making measurements
on the S−O system. Simultaneous use of these different
levels does not lead to any contradiction [4,5]. And there
is no regress at infinity, unless we inquire about absolute
reality, an inquiry which, I suspect, is illegitimate. These
ideas are discussed, in various versions, in [5] and in [4,6].
The existence of the M operator and the solution of the
timing problem suggested here find a natural framework
within these views, but do not require them.
I thank Rob Clifton for bringing reference [5] to my at-
tention and for a careful reading of this manuscript; Euan
Squires, Jim Hartle and Bob Griffiths for a long and ex-
tremely valuable e-mail correspondence on these matters;
John Earman, Chris Isham, John Baez, Bill Curry, Ted
Newman, Lee Smolin and Louis Crane for comments and
conversations. I also thank Asher Peres for bringing ref-
erence [3] to my attention, after I had posted the first
version of this paper in the Los Alamos Archives. I apol-
ogize with him and with Bill Wootters for having over-
looked their important work at first. Support for this
work came from NSF grant PHY-95-15506.
measurements, quantum events, or otherwise, or we refuse to
name them, remains. Talking about their timing, as I have
attempted here, is an indirect way of addressing the issue.
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